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NOT FOR PROFIT INCOME TAX EXEMPTION: IS 
THERE A HOLE IN THE BUCKET, DEAR 
HENRY? 
 
There's a hole in the bucket, dear Liza, dear Liza,  
There's a hole in the bucket, dear Liza, a hole.  
Then fix it, dear Henry, dear Henry, dear Henry,  
Then fix it, dear Henry, dear Henry, fix it.  
ABSTRACT 
Australia’s Future Tax System Review, headed by the then head of the Australian Treasury, 
and the Productivity Commission’s Research Report on the not for profit sector, both examined 
the state of tax concessions to Australia’s not for profit sector in the light of the High Court’s 
decision in Commissioner of Taxation v Word Investments Ltd. Despite being unable to 
quantify with any certainty the pre- or post-Word Investments cost of the tax concessions, both 
Reports indicated their support for continuation of the income tax exemption. However, the 
government acted in the 2011 Budget to target the not for profit income tax concessions more 
precisely, mainly on competitive neutrality grounds. 
 
This article examines the income tax exemption by applying the five taxation design principles, 
proposed in the Australia’s Future Tax System Review, for assessing tax expenditure. The 
conclusion is that the exemptions can be justified and, further, that a rationale for the exemption 
can be consistent with the reasoning in the Word Investments case. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION –THERE’S A HOLE IN THE BUCKET SO FIX IT DEAR HENRY 
Exemption from taxation is a controversial issue. The popular media discourse assumes that an 
income tax exemption for not-for-profit organisations (NFPs) is a concession — a hole in the 
revenue bucket gushing a state subsidy funded by taxpayers. The discourse invariably begins 
with whether the subsidy is an unmeritorious use of taxpayers’ funds and then chronicles the 
unfair impost it places on small business competitors.1 A case involving the Australian 
                                                 
1 Nick Renton, 'Taxpayers' Sacrifice to the Churches', The Age (Melbourne), 6 May 2008, 1; Opinion, 'Freedom of 
Religion Should Not Mean Freedom from Scrutiny', Sydney Morning Herald (Sydney), 20 May 2008, 12; Adele 
 2 
Commissioner of Taxation calling to account an organisation with religious purposes that 
enjoyed income tax exemption while all of its activities were commercial attracted the usual 
media comment.2 The situation was exacerbated in that case by all of the income being passed 
on to another organisation which utilised most of the income for Bible translation work 
overseas. That case was Commissioner of Taxation v Word Investments Ltd (Word Investments) 
and it eventually made its way through the appeal courts to the High Court in December 2008.3 
The High Court held that the income of a charitable organisation conducting business activities 
to fund charitable purposes conducted by another organisation was exempt from income tax. 
The consequence is that charities are defined by reference to a charitable purpose, not to their 
activities or legal form. Case notes and articles written immediately after the High Court 
decision foreshadowed the possibility of legislation to reverse or reform the situation,4 as did 
the new edition of Dal Pont’s Law of Charity.5 
 
The Australian Government indicated that it would monitor the situation and await the 
recommendations of the Australia’s Future Tax System Review (Henry Review) which was 
                                                                                                                                                        
Ferguson, 'Extreme Charity', The Age (Melbourne), 12 February 2010, 8; Adele Ferguson, 'Charities and Churches 
Stand to Lose Billions in Tax Review', The Australian (Sydney), 28 July 2008, 1–2; Adele Ferguson, 'Charity 
Begins at Home with Tax Perks', The Australian (Sydney), 21 July 2008, 36; Lucinda Schmidt, 'Tax Perk for 
'Benevolent' Workers' (2005) (24–30 March) Business Review Weekly 52. See also: Max Wallace, The Purple 
Economy: Supernatural Charities, Tax and the State (Australian National Secular Association, 2007). 
2 Patrick Durkin, 'Charity Can Begin at Business, High Court Rules', Australian Financial Review (Melbourne), 4 
December 2008, 5; Barney Zwatz, 'Charities Cheer Tax-Exempt Rule After Years of Wrangling', The Age 
(Melbourne), 4 December 2008, 11. 
3 Commissioner of Taxation of the Commonwealth of Australia v Word Investments Ltd (2008) 236 CLR 204. Prior 
litigation history: Re Applicant and Federal Commissioner of Taxation; sub nom Case 11/2005 [2005] AATA 941 
(Administrative Appeals Tribunal, 27 September 2005); Commissioner of Taxation (Cth) v Word Investments Ltd 
(2006) 64 ATR 483 (Federal Court, Sundberg J, 3 November 2006); Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Word 
Investments Ltd (2007) 164 FCR 194 (Federal Court of Australia, Full Court, 14 November 2007).  
4 Ian Murray, ‘Charitable Fundraising through Commercial Activities: The Final Word or a Pyrrhic Victory?’ 
(2008) 11 Journal of Australian Taxation 138; Ian Murray, 'Charity Means Business – Commissioner of Taxation 
v Word Investments Ltd' (2009) 31 Sydney Law Review 309, 329; Derek Mortimer, 'A Word About Charity' (2010) 
(April) Law Institute Journal 50, 53; Claire Russell, 'A Word to the Wise' (2009) 61 Keeping Good Companies 
179; Robert Richards, 'A Green Light for Charities' (2009) 79(1) Intheblack 66; Michael Gousmett, 'Charities and 
Business Activities' (2009) New Zealand Law Journal 57; Kerrie Sadiq and Catherine Richardson, ‘Tax 
Concessions for Charities: Competitive Neutrality, the Tax Base and “Public Goods” Choice’ (2010) 25 Australian 
Tax Forum 113. 
5 GE Dal Pont, Law of Charity (LexisNexis Butterworths, 2010) 63. 
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specifically tasked to examine tax expenditures such as the income tax exemption for NFPs,6 
but warned that it would act sooner if there were ‘adverse implications’.7 The Australian 
Taxation Office (ATO) put the area on a ‘watch listing’.8  Its Impact Statement on the Word 
Investments case anticipated an equal application to a charitable, religious, scientific, or public 
educational institutions, but not other categories of NFP income tax exemption listed in 
Division 50 Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (ITAA 97).9   
 
The Henry Review, led by then head of the Australian Treasury, recommended that the 
exemption continue to apply not only to charities but all NFPs and that unrelated business 
income continue to be exempt in the following terms: 
 
Categories of NFP organisations that currently receive income tax or GST concessions 
should retain these concessions.  NFP organisations should be permitted to apply their 
income concessions to their commercial activities.10 
 
This came about as the Henry Review’s ninth term of reference directed it to consider ‘all 
relevant tax expenditures’, which necessarily included income tax exemption for certain NFP 
entities. The Review recommended that a tax expenditure assessment should consider 
efficiency, equity, complexity, sustainability and policy consistency, which essentially mirror 
the Review’s taxation design principles.11 The Review’s recommendation appeared at odds 
with Treasury’s and the ATO’s traditional policy view that NFP income tax concessions should 
be replaced by annual direct grants. This view was made plain in the opening paragraph of the 
ATO’s submission to the Charities Definition Inquiry: 
 
                                                 
6 Australia’s Future Tax System Review, Terms of Reference, no 9, 
http://taxreview.treasury.gov.au/content/Content.aspx?doc=html/reference.htm.  
7 Chris Bowen, Assistant Treasurer, ‘Government’s Interim Response to High Court’s Decision in Word 
Investments Case’ (Media Release, 043, 12 May 2009).  
8 Australian Taxation Office, Compliance Program 2010–11 (7 August 2010) 
http://www.ato.gov.au/corporate/content.asp?doc=/content/00248103.htm&page=16&H16. 
9 Australian Taxation Office, Decision Impact Statement: Commissioner of Taxation v Word Investments Ltd (26 
May 2009) http://law.ato.gov.au/atolaw/view.htm?DocID=LIT/ICD/M41/3008/00001. 
10 Australia's Future Tax System Review Panel, Australia’s Future Tax System: Report to the Treasurer (The 
Treasury, 2009) 88 (‘Henry Review’). 
11 Ibid 725. 
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It is our view that the current system of tax concessions provides an unnecessary layer 
of administrative cost and complexity, and lacks transparency.  We would accordingly 
favour a single targetted, transparent and accountable program of direct outlays.12 
 
Reporting after the Henry Review, but conducted in parallel, the Productivity Commission 
found that the actual monetary value of the charity income tax exemption is unknown.13 It 
estimated ‘the value of tax concessions given by all Australian governments to NFPs to be at 
least $4 billion in 2008–09 and that it could realistically be twice this amount when non-
estimated expenditures are included’.14 Notwithstanding this, and consistent with the Henry 
Review, the Productivity Commission Report also endorsed the findings of the Industry 
Commission in 1995, and concluded that NFP income tax exemptions should remain and 
include unrelated business income.15 The Treasurer and Prime Minister indicated in response to 
the Henry Review that they would not make any changes to the tax system that would harm the 
sector including removing the benefit of tax concessions,16 and many believed that Word 
Investments would not be altered by legislation.17 
 
The 2011 Budget contained a number of reforms concerning the NFP sector, including 
removing tax concessions from income generated by and retained in new unrelated commercial 
activities commencing after 10 May 2011 (budget night). Initially only applying to new 
commercial activities, existing activities will be phased in over time after consultation.18 A 
                                                 
12 Australian Taxation Office, Inquiry into Charities and Related Organisations: Submission by the Australian 
Taxation Office (19 January 2001) ‘Transmission letter’, http://www.cdi.gov.au/html/public_submissions.htm. 
13 Productivity Commission, Contribution of the Not-for-Profit Sector: Research Report (2010) xxxi, 76 
(‘Productivity Commission Research Report’). 
14 Ibid 78.  
15 Ibid 203–5; Industry Commission, Charitable Organisations in Australia (Report No 45, 1995) appendix K 
(‘Industry Commission Report’). The Productivity Commisssion’s terms of reference (pp iv–v of the Research 
Report) included to ‘examine the extent to which tax exemptions assessed by the commercial operations of not-for-
profit organisations may affect the competitive neutrality of the market’, whilst it was also to have regard to the 
Henry Taxation Review and the Inquiry into the Definition of Charities and Related Organisations (2001). 
16 Wayne Swan and Kevin Rudd, ‘Stronger, Fairer, Simpler: A Tax Plan for Our Future’ (Joint Media Release, 
No 028, 2 May 2010). 
17 Fiona Martin, ‘The legal concept of charity in the context of Australian taxation law: The public benefit and 
commercial activity, important issues for indigenous charities’ (2010) 25 Australian Tax Forum 275, 299. 
18 Treasury, Budget Measures 2011–12 (Budget Paper No. 2, 10 May 2011) 36. 
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Treasury Consultation paper about reforming the use of tax concessions by businesses operated 
by NFP entities was released in the following weeks.19 It broadly proposed that NFP entities 
pay tax on any retained earnings not annually remitted and applied to the purposes of the tax 
concession entity and that existing input tax concessions such as FBT and GST would not be 
available for unrelated commercial activities. There was no apparent discussion of why the 
government decided not to heed the advice of the previous inquiries, even those which had 
considered the impact of the Word Investments decision. The reasons given were couched in 
terms of ‘competitive neutrality’ or level playing field with the added benefit of protecting 
NFPs from unnecessary commercial risks.20 
 
This policy disparity is not uncommon in relation to nonprofit taxation exemption. In the UK, 
‘there was no policy’ underpinning the original exemptions.21 The United States is 
characterised by ‘peculiar incentives’ and ‘upside-down’22 subsidies, with US legislatures 
being ‘generally silent about the dispositive reasons’.23 In the Australian context, Ann 
O’Connell investigated the exemption and found not only that ‘the provisions are extremely 
complex’,24 but also, far from identifying a unifying theme, found ‘most surprisingly, the exact 
nature and scope of the income tax exemptions, … are largely creatures of accident and fitful 
attention by the legislature’.25 The absence of a clearly articulated income tax exemption 
                                                 
19 Treasury, Better targeting of not-for-profit tax concessions (Consultation Paper, 27 May 2011) 
http://www.treasury.gov.au/contentitem.asp?NavId=037&ContentID=2056. 
20 Ibid 1. 
21  Richard Tompson, The Charity Commission and the Age of Reform (Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1979) 62. But 
see Michael Gousmett, The Charitable Purposes Exemption from Income Tax: Pitt to Pemsel 1798–1891 (PhD 
Thesis, University of Canterbury, 2009) 13, 33–43. 
22 Evelyn Brody, ‘Charities in Tax Reform: Threats to Subsidies Overt and Covert’ (1999) 66 Tennessee Law 
Review 687, 701, 714. 
23 Penina Kessler Lieber, 'United States Tax Treatment of Nonprofit Organizations' in Paul Bater, Frits Hondius 
and Penina Kessler Lieber (eds), The Tax Treatment of NGOs: Legal, Ethical and Fiscal Frameworks for 
Promoting NGOs and their Activities (Kluwer Law International, 2004) 173, 180; Susan M Sanders, 'The 
"Common Sense" of the Nonprofit Hospital Tax Exemption: A Policy Analysis' (2007) 14 Journal of Policy 
Analysis and Management 446. 
24 Ann O'Connell, 'The Tax Position of Charities in Australia – Why Does it Have to Be So Complicated?' (2008) 
37 Australian Tax Review 17, 19. 
25 Ann O’Connell, 'Charitable Treatment? – A (Potted) History of the Taxation of Charities in Australia' (Paper 
presented at the Tax History Conference 2010, Cambridge, 5–6 July 2010) 27. 
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jurisprudence, coupled with widespread popular concern that there is a hole in the revenue 
bucket, invite academic inquiry. 
 
This article explores an underlying rationale for the exemption. We do this by adopting the five 
taxation design principles proposed in the Henry Review for assessing tax expenditure. This 
discussion addresses the many popular concerns and provides reasoning to support Henry 
Review Recommendation 42, that the scope of the exemption should continue to be broad and 
extend to include commercial activities.  It deepens the theoretical foundations of reasoning set 
out in the Word Investments decision. The conclusion to which we come is that any suggestion 
of a hole in the revenue bucket is misconceived.  The exemptions can be justified. If 
conceptually sound reform is to be accomplished, the exemption debate must be conducted at 
the higher level of the size and shape of the revenue bucket itself.  
 
2. THE POLICY ISSUES — WHAT SORT OF BUCKET DO WE WANT? 
The Henry Review paid special attention to the use of the tax system to achieve policy 
objectives other than exclusively to raise revenue to fund government activities. These policy 
objectives can be achieved by tax concessions, known as ‘tax expenditures’. The Henry Review 
adopted the orthodox view that such tax expenditures should be assessed against alternative 
policy options, such as an equivalent spending program, in order to justify their introduction or 
continuance. The Review placed such ‘policy trade-offs’ at the centre of its future tax design 
schema.26 The policy trade-offs are often informed by practice and so we will endeavour to 
address a number of the practical issues and experiences internationally, as well as the 
theoretical concerns.   
 
As stated above, the Henry Review recommended that a tax expenditure assessment should 
consider efficiency, equity, complexity, sustainability and policy consistency, which  align with 
the Review’s design principles in other taxation matters.27 It is not apparent from the face of the 
Henry Review that all the recommended design principles for tax expenditure evaluation were 
applied to its review of NFP tax concessions. The NFP section of the report focuses on reasons 
for the concessions, their complexity and competitive neutrality. We will apply the Henry 
                                                 
26 Henry Review, 15, Chart 2.1. 
27 Ibid 725. 
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Review’s formal full design principles to the NFP income tax concession with recourse to the 
available research, theory and evidence-based data to inform the evaluation. 
 
Before we can begin that discussion there are two important foundational issues that need to be 
addressed. The first, which was assumed by the Henry Review, is whether a NFP income tax 
concession should in fact be classified as a tax expenditure. This unresolved debate is traceable 
to at least the mid-1970s in the United States.28 Second, if the exemption is regarded as a tax 
expenditure, how is it to be measured? For comparisons to be made with other policy options, 
we must start with appropriate measurement of the expenditures involved. These two critical 
matters underpin and inform the application of the design principles, but were assumed or 
overlooked. Our exploration of these matters will show that both the inclusion of NFP revenue 
and how it is measured are arbitrary and problematic; and the outcomes are less than promising 
for a good policy basis. 
 
2.1 Who decided that ‘There’s a hole in the bucket’?  
As we highlighted in the introduction, popular media assume that a charities’ income tax 
exemption is in fact a gaping hole leaking billions of government funded subsidies from the 
revenue.29 As noted above, the Productivity Commission could only estimate ‘the value of tax 
concessions given by all Australian governments to NFPs’ in 2008–09 at between $4 billion 
and $8 billion.30  
 
The concept of tax expenditures was developed in the United States as a method of shining a 
light on subsidies in the form of tax concessions to privileged taxpayers.31 As tax expenditures, 
otherwise hidden tax concessions would be tabled for public review as part of the government’s 
annual budget processes. The Henry Review acknowledges the arbitrariness of deciding what is 
in and out of the tax expenditure category declaring: 
 
                                                 
28 Boris Bittker and George Rahdert, 'The Exemption of Nonprofit Organizations from Federal Income Taxation' 
(1976) 85(3) Yale Law Journal 301, 301. 
29 Adele Ferguson, ‘Extreme Charity’, The Age (Melbourne) 12 February 2010, 8, quoting the Productivity 
Commission’s Report as saying ‘it could be $4 billion or double that’.  
30 Productivity Commission Research Report, 78.  
31 Stanley S Surrey, Pathways to Tax Reform: The Concept of Tax Expenditures (Harvard University Press, 1973). 
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Not all concessional elements of the tax system are classified as tax expenditures. This 
is because some concessions are considered to be structural elements of the tax system 
and are incorporated in the benchmark. For example, the personal income tax system 
includes a progressive marginal tax rate scale, which results in individuals on lower 
incomes paying a lower marginal rate of income tax than those on higher incomes. This 
arrangement is a structural design feature of the Australian tax system and is therefore 
not identified as a tax expenditure. There may be different views on which structural 
elements to include in the benchmark. These benchmarks can vary over time and can 
sometimes be perceived as arbitrary.32 
 
The tax expenditure process can only operate if a ‘benchmark’ or ‘ideal’ tax base is clearly 
defined, so any subsidy can be identified and measured. The definitional boundaries of this 
ideal tax base have not been a neat application of a set of agreed principles. This is because tax 
theory is contested and different applications of theory result in different ideal tax bases.33 
Borderline issues were not determined by rigorous classification to a stated and principled 
model and thus are contestable.34 A manifestation of this is that in America there are two 
official tax expenditure statements, each driven by political considerations rather than a 
unifying theory.35 There has been an ongoing, vigorous debate about the classification of NFP 
income tax concessions and gifts as tax expenditures. The debate spreads to other issues such as 
exemption of local and state government and payment of their taxes, domestic housing 
incentive programs, educational and medical expenses.36 
                                                 
32 Henry Review, 731. 
33 See Boris Bittker and George Rahdert, 'The Exemption of Nonprofit Organizations from Federal Income 
Taxation' (1976) 85(3) Yale Law Journal 301; Evelyn Brody, 'Of Sovereignty and Subsidy: Conceptualizing the 
Charity Tax Exemption' (1998) 23 Journal of Corporation Law 585; Timothy Goodspeed and Daphne Kenyon, 
'The Nonprofit Sector's Capital Contraint: Does it provide a rationale for the tax exemption granted to nonprofit 
firms?' (1993) 21(4) Public Finance Quarterly 415; Henry Hansmann, 'Unfair Competition and the Unrelated 
Business Income Tax' (1989) 75(3) Virginia Law Review 605. 
34 Paul R McDaniel and Stanley S Surrey (eds), International Aspects of Tax Expenditures: A Comparative Study 
(Kluwer Law and Taxation, 1985). 
35 Ole Gjems-Onstad, 'Tax Expenditure: A Criticism of the Concept as Applied to Nongovernmental Organizations' 
(1990) 19 Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly 279, 283; since 1982 the Office of Management and Budget 
and the Congressional Budget Office have produced tax expenditure statements based on different principles. 
36 Stanley S Surrey, Pathways to Tax Reform: The Concept of Tax Expenditures (Harvard University Press, 1973) 
ch VII, 209; Stanley S Surrey and Paul R McDaniel, Tax Expenditures (Harvard University Press, 1985); Paul R 
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The Henry Review did not address the issue of whether exemptions for certain NFP 
organisations were appropriately classified as tax expenditures. The issue was considered in 
1995 when the Industry Commission raised it briefly, noted the contest, but declined to 
challenge the status quo.37 In 2010, the Productivity Commission took a similar approach.38 We 
review two viewpoints about nonprofit income tax expenditures and develop an argument 
based on the mutuality principle.  
 
In the early 1990s, Krever challenged the classification on theoretical grounds in the context of 
the Australian exemptions and concluded that ‘little or no revenue is forgone by exempting the 
charity from tax’.39  He arrived at this conclusion by noting that individuals are the accepted 
and appropriate unit upon which to impose income taxes. By definition, charities have no 
owners, only purposes, and are legally prohibited from distributing surpluses to individuals, so 
the income would have to be traced through to the individuals who benefited from the 
achievement of their stated purposes.40 Tracing individual beneficiaries would be difficult and 
expensive. Many beneficiaries of charities would be unlikely to pay tax because they are 
financially disadvantaged; or when public goods are involved they are so broadly spread and 
numerous that tracing them would be administratively unworkable.41 NFPs with members, such 
as sporting clubs, could be said to have owners in the sense of surplus property being 
distributed to them on winding up; but NFPs with income tax exemptions are required to forgo 
this by provisions in their constitutions restricting distribution only to an equivalent tax exempt 
entity. This misfit arises when applying tax expenditure theory to NFPs because personal gain, 
at the heart of income tax, is not the primary purpose of the not for profit undertaking.  
                                                                                                                                                        
McDaniel and Stanley S Surrey (eds), International Aspects of Tax Expenditures: A Comparative Study (Kluwer 
Law and Taxation, 1985); William D Andrews, 'Personal Deductions in an Ideal Income Tax' (1972) 86 Harvard 
Law Review 309; Evelyn Brody, 'Of Sovereignty and Subsidy: Conceptualizing the Charity Tax Exemption' (1998) 
23 Journal of Corporation Law 585.  
37 Industry Commission Report, 268. 
38 Productivity Commission Research Report, Box E.1. 
39 Richard Krever, 'Tax Deductions for Charitable Donations: A Tax Expenditure Analysis' in Richard Krever and 
Gretchen Kewley (eds), Charities and Philanthropic Institutions: Reforming the Tax Subsidy and Regulatory 
Regimes (Comparative Public Policy Research Unit, Monash University, 1991) 1, 4.  
40 Ibid 3–4. 
41 Examples are the NFP provision of food to those without means of providing for themselves, or medical research 
which advantages everyone in the community. 
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Gjems-Onstad takes up this issue arguing that when tax laws make concessions for NFP 
organisations, it is often because they are different from individual and ‘for profit’ taxpayers.42 
A tax designed for individuals and businesses has unintended consequences for NFP 
organisations. The contested classifications are non-business sector transactions such as gifts 
and government entity transactions. Gjems-Onstad shows that orthodox income tax theory has 
difficulty coping with non-business situations, where personal gain is not at the core. When the 
legislature makes exceptions for NFP organisations because they do not fit the personal gain 
model on which the taxation provision is based, the exemption ought not be viewed as a 
subsidy or a tax expenditure. If the reason for counting it as a tax expenditure is purely 
technical, it is misleading to regard it as a subsidy or concession extended to NFP 
organisations.  
 
Perhaps the argument can be advanced further by examining the concept of mutuality. The 
doctrine of mutuality begins from the premise that an organisation cannot gain income from 
itself.43 Receipts from members are simply pooled funds and, currently, are not treated as tax 
expenditure by the Australian Taxation Expenditure Statements.44 This concept has 
international approbation, being outside the Schanz-Haig-Simons framework.45 We argue that, 
if an organisation derives its income from the community (whether by gifts or sales) and it 
applies its income to the benefit of that community not to individuals, then by parity of 
reasoning and extension of the mutuality principle the income should be exempt because 
members of the society are pooling their resources for their mutual benefit. On this basis, there 
is no income to tax and therefore no concession and no revenue forgone. 
                                                 
42 Ole Gjems-Onstad, 'Tax Expenditure: A Criticism of the Concept as Applied to Nongovernmental Organizations' 
(1990) 19 Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly 279. 
43 Bohemians Club v Acting Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1918) 24 CLR 334. 
44 Australian Taxation Office, 'Mutuality and Taxable Income' (Guide No. NAT 73436–07.2010, July 2010) 
http://www.ato.gov.au/content/downloads/NFP00246017.pdf; see also: Treasury, Tax Expenditures Statement 
2009 (2010), 205. 
45 J King, 'The Concept of Income' in Parthasrathi Shome (ed), Tax Policy Handbook (Tax Policy Division, 
International Monetary Fund, 1995) 117; Georg von Schanz, 'Der Einkommensbegriff und die 
Einkommensteuergesetze' (1896) 13 Finanzarchiv 1; Robert M Haig, 'The Concept of Income – Economic and 
Legal Aspects' in Robert Murray Haig (ed), The Federal Income Tax (Columbia University Press, 1921) 1; Henry 
Simons, Personal Income Taxation: the Definition of Income as a Problem of Fiscal Policy (University of Chicago 
Press, 1938) 49. 
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The fundamental characteristics of NFPs being for broad public benefit purposes and the loose 
tax expenditure concepts conspire to place NFPs in an ambiguous zone. This ambuiguity is 
compounded when the benefit has to be measured. 
 
2.2 How do we measure the ‘leak’? 
Having assumed that there is a hole in the tax bucket, it must be measured for annual budgetary 
scrutiny to determine its worthiness and whether other policy alternatives may be more 
attractive. The Henry Review made recommendations to improve the measurement of tax 
expenditures.46 This was on the back of a substantial report on tax expenditure statements by 
the Australian National Audit Office (ANAO), which recommended significant reforms to 
present practices.47 The recommendations of the Henry Review and the ‘significant reforms to 
present practices’ called for by the ANAO are likely to test the current approach. Two 
measurement issues are critical. The first is that current measurement is largely non-existent 
because data are not collected.  Second, the current measurement method is flawed for this 
particular tax expenditure. 
 
The cost of income tax exemption has been quantified in Australia’s tax expenditure statement 
for only 13 of 22 categories with some relation to the NFP sector, and those measurements 
have been described by the Productivity Commission as having low reliability.48 In 2011 the 
best that can be done for religious, scientific, charitable or public educational institutions is an 
order of magnitude ‘guesstimate’ of $1,000 million plus.49 The order of magnitude 
classifications are described as a ‘broad guide only ... estimated without the benefit of detailed 
data. They are based on assumptions and judgment and as such they should be treated with 
caution.’50 
 
The Australian Treasury has used the revenue forgone method, which measures ‘the difference 
in tax paid by taxpayers who receive a particular concession relative to similar taxpayers who 
                                                 
46 ‘G5-2 Managing, measuring and reporting on tax expenditures’, Henry Review, 724. 
47 Australian National Audit Office, 'Preparation of the Tax Expenditures Statement: Department of the Treasury, 
Performance Audit' (Audit Report No 32, 8 May 2008). 
48 Productivity Commission Research Report, Appendix E, E.7 
49 Treasury, Tax Expenditures Statement 2009 (2010), item B23, 74. 
50 Ibid 29. 
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do not receive that concession’.51 The assumption is that taxpayers will not change their 
behaviour and the NFP taxpayers will behave in a similar fashion to for-profit taxpayers. The 
ANAO report on tax expenditures described this method as ‘similar to assuming taxpayer 
behaviour does not respond to changes in price, notwithstanding the fact that many concessions 
are specifically intended as incentives’.52 This assumption is unlikely to hold.  The Word 
Investments case53 showed that Word was able to, and did move through a number of 
structures. Analysis of the Unrelated Business Income Tax in the US led one academic to 
conclude that it was ‘a voluntary tax’,54 that is, organisations choose to retain the structure 
which results in their being subject to the tax or not. In the discussion of complexity below we 
set out a range of ways that NFPs could alter their structure or behaviour so as to maintain 
exemption if the tax regime changes. If it is possible for NFPs to avoid the tax by other means, 
then the assumption that removing the concession would result in more tax collected is 
dubious. Other methods to measure such expenditure may largely avoid this issue. 
 
The ANAO report explored the suitability of two other recognised approaches to measuring tax 
expenditures, the ‘revenue gain’ and the ‘outlay equivalence’ approach. The revenue gain 
approach measures how much revenue would increase if a particular tax concession were 
removed. Accurate assessment of this cost requires estimates of the behavioural effects 
associated with such a change.55 If there is not any gain in revenue, either because the ‘revenue’ 
was not taxable income or because it will flow to others for tax exempt purposes, then the view 
that present tax expenditure amounts are a complete loss to the revenue base is not supportable. 
 
The outlay equivalence approach estimates how much direct expenditure would be needed to 
provide a benefit equivalent to that provided by the tax expenditure. This approach measures 
the direct expenditure required, in before tax dollars, to achieve the same after tax dollar benefit 
as the tax expenditure, where the direct expenditure undergoes the tax treatment appropriate for 
                                                 
51 Treasury, Tax Expenditures Statement 2009 (2010), 16. 
52 Australian National Audit Office, 'Preparation of the Tax Expenditures Statement: Department of the Treasury, 
Performance Audit' (Audit Report No 32, 8 May 2008), 63. 
53 See particularly the AAT hearing decision: Re Applicant and FC of T; Case 11/2005 [2005] AATA 941. 
54 Evelyn Brody and Joseph Cordes, 'The Unrelated Business Income Tax: All Bark and No Bite?' (Seminar Series 
No 3, The Urban Institute Center on Nonprofits and Philanthropy, 2001)  
55 Ibid 16; Australian National Audit Office, 'Preparation of the Tax Expenditures Statement: Department of the 
Treasury, Performance Audit' (Audit Report No 32, 8 May 2008), ch 4, 62 ff. 
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that type of income in the hands of the recipient. This harks back to the ATO’s position 
discussed above, that NFP tax concessions should be replaced by a program of direct outlays.56 
The first issue is how to quantify the funds through grants or other non-taxation concessions 
that would be needed to produce the benefit equivalent to the amount of the tax expenditure. 
Second, as both the Productivity Commision and Henry Review note, there is a broader, 
unmeasurable but significant, contribution to the public good that is involved.57 The 
measurement would be extremely difficult. 
If the same benefits were desired, based on what we know about the current administration and 
compliance costs of grant arrangements, to produce the same reach and effect as that produced 
by income tax concessions would require significant establishment and on-going administration 
costs.58 To gauge the extent of this challenge, consider that there are 53,773 ATO-endorsed 
income tax exempt charities (as at October 2010), plus an unknown number (estimated at 
around 400,000) of organisations that do not require endorsement and self-assess as exempt 
under Division 50.59 Add to this that most NFPs are relatively small organisations where 
taxation compliance costs are regressive.60 
In summary, both the inclusion of NFP revenue in the tax base and how it is measured are 
arbitrary and problematic. At the very least there is a compelling argument for redefinition of 
our ‘ruler’ for NFP concessions and the collection of data. These limitations must be 
acknowledged in any contemporary policy discourse and actively redressed for ongoing 
transparency and monitoring.  
 
With these two preliminary issues now dealt with, and noting the limitations that accompany 
their lack of resolution, the Henry Review’s design principles for tax expenditures can be 
applied to income tax exemptions for NFPs.  These design principles are: efficiency, equity, 
complexity, sustainability, and consistency with policy. 
 
                                                 
56 See text accompanying n 12 above. 
57 Productivity Commission Research Report, ch 4; Henry Review, 205–6. 
58 M McGregor-Lowndes and C Ryan, 'Reducing the Compliance Burden of Non-Profit Organisations: Cutting 
Red Tape' (2009) 68(1) Australian Journal of Public Administration 21. 
59 Australian Taxation Office, Taxation Statistics 2007–08 (2010) ch 10, 
http://www.ato.gov.au/corporate/content.asp?doc=/content/00225078.htm. 
60 Ibid; Henry Review, 60. 
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2.3 Efficiency: the quest for a leak-proof bucket  
The first tax expenditure design principle discussed by the Henry Review is efficiency. Tax 
expenditures can impose efficiency costs by encouraging taxpayers to undertake tax-favoured 
activities at the expense of other activities. The Review notes that some tax expenditures 
correct market failures and thus improve efficiency by ‘encouraging activities that would 
otherwise be underprovided’61 and may save in government administration costs of direct 
supervision of a policy.62 The Review’s application of this principle in its discussion of NFP 
organisations is largely realised. It lists the reasons for government support as: 
 
 NFP organisations supply goods and services with broad public benefits that may not 
otherwise be provided by private businesses. These benefits may be direct (such as 
providing legal advice to the homeless) or indirect (such as organising community 
sporting activities). 
 NFP organisations are often more effective service providers than government or for-
profit organisations, given their unique relationship with the community. An increasing 
number of traditionally government activities are being outsourced to NFP 
organisations. 
 The activities of NFP organisations often supplement, or complement, existing 
government programs.63 
The first reason reflects the orthodox economic view discussed above, that without government 
intervention, public goods64 and quasi-public goods65 are usually not produced in the for-profit 
sector. As the market is unlikely to produce enough of such goods, governments may wish 
(often because of voter demand) to encourage their provision.66 The question is how to do this. 
                                                 
61 Henry Review, 725. 
62 Ibid 726. 
63 Ibid 206. 
64 Pure public goods are those which inherently have non-excludability (consumers cannot be prevented from 
benefiting except at great cost) and non-rivalry (one individual’s use does not reduce the amount available for 
others) such as lighthouses, parks, statues  and public works of art. 
65 Quasi-public goods are things such as public roads or public transport where non-excludability or non-rivalry 
may be weak or absent.  
66 Burton A Weisbrod, 'Toward a Theory of the Voluntary Nonprofit Sector in a Three-Sector Economy' in Burton 
A Weisbrod (ed.), The Voluntary Nonprofit Sector (DC Heath, 1977) 51. 
 15 
There are two options commonly proposed. The first, traditionally preferred by Treasury, is 
direct grants to NFPs considered appropriate to provide the relevant public or quasi-public 
goods. The second is to allow NFPs to identify and generate these public goods voluntarily 
with the income tax exemption intended to encourage this. To give effect to this second policy 
option it became a clearly established principle of the law of charity that a trust is not charitable 
unless it is directed to the public benefit.67 The Word Investments decision reflects the charity 
law heritage of requiring an organisation’s purpose to achieve a public benefit in order for it to 
be regarded as charitable.   
 
The Henry Review made no comparison to a direct spending program scenario or some other 
policy instrument to achieve these objects more efficiently than tax expenditure. Instead, it 
concentrated on the issue of competitive neutrality, the complexity of laws and their 
administration, and the lack of appropriate measures and accountability. The reluctance to 
follow the design principles is understandable: as noted above, there are no appropriate 
measures of direct program funding received by NFP organisations which could serve as a 
comparison to these particular tax expenditures.  
 
Another way to examine the issue is to try to forecast the results of removing the tax 
expenditure.  If its removal was effected in such a way that there was little opportunity for 
NFPs to reorganise their affairs to avoid income tax, then an amount of tax would be collected 
by the revenue authorities. Usually, NFPs that are delivering government funded services 
cannot pass on the increased costs to their clients as for-profit businesses would do.  This is a 
problem that arises in relation to the supply of public and quasi-public goods, or because their 
‘clients’ are unable to afford the increase. This may induce some NFPs to produce fewer goods 
and services, which would in theory be replaced by direct annual grants or subsidies to NFP 
organisations where the government deemed it desirable. Until we have a better understanding 
of the measurable costs, such a calculation can only be guessed at. However, there are some 
issues that could make direct administration of any type of subsidy program costly. 
 
The first issue was exposed when the Productivity Commission devoted a significant part of its 
report to analysing the purchase of services from NFP organisations, and found that the 
purchase price did not reflect the actual cost of provision, with the shortfall being made up by 
                                                 
67 Oppenheim v Tobacco Securities Trust Co Ltd [1951] AC 297, 305 (Lord Simmonds). 
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client fees, volunteer labour, philanthropy and unrelated business venture contributions.68  The 
Productivity Commission estimated the shortfall to be approximately 30 per cent across all 
government departments.69 If the government wishes to maintain output of services to the 
public at current levels, it will have to pay more on its contracts for those services. State 
governments, which are often intermediaries in federal funding to NFPs, will also be affected.  
 
Second, the majority (estimated at 440,000 of 600,000) of NFP organisations are small and the 
government’s administrative costs in dealing with a large number of small organisations would 
be high.70 On the other side, we know small organisations’ compliance costs are significantly 
regressive.71  
 
Third, tax expenditures provide a reliable source of funding with significant notice of 
withdrawal because of the legislative process. Annual review of direct grants takes away this 
assurance, which may influence organisations to be more risk averse in their outlook and tend 
to hold greater financial reserves. In turn this may decrease the supply of their services and 
public goods.72 Further, many NFP organisations have relatively short-term income streams 
such as annual grants and donations while income tax exemption providesd a longer term 
arrangement. 
 
Fourth, the collection of necessary information to establish tax expenditures and make 
organisations transparent is not a costless transaction. The Charity Commission of England and 
Wales which supervises about 190,000 organisations with 471 staff has a budget of 
£32.3 million (2008–09 figures).73 The New Zealand Charities Commission regulates about 
25,000 organisations with a budget of approximately NZ$6.3 million (2009 figures).74 The US 
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has 940 staff in their exempt organizations division, 549 of 
                                                 
68 Productivity Commission Research Report, 281. 
69 Ibid. 
70 Ibid XXVI. 
71 M McGregor-Lowndes and C Ryan, 'Reducing the Compliance Burden of Non-Profit Organisations: Cutting 
Red Tape' (2009) 68(1) Australian Journal of Public Administration 21. 
72 B Weisbrod (ed) To Profit or Not to Profit: The Commercial Transformation of the Nonprofit Sector (Cambridge 
University Press, 1998). 
73 Charity Commission for England and Wales, Annual Report 2008–09 (The Stationery Office, 2009) 14. 
74 Charities Commission (NZ), Annual Report 2009–10 (2010) 23. 
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whom are employed in examinations.75 In comparison, Australia’s largest NFP regulatory 
agency is the ATO with 61.4 full-time equivalent staff devoted to NFP areas.76 There is a 
natural concern about the possibility of abuse of the exemption but there is a cost associated 
with policing.  Following the UK and New Zealand example the Henry Review recommended 
an independent commission, separate from the ATO, to oversee and regulate access to the 
exemption.77 In the 2011 Budget, the government announced its intention to establish an 
Australian Charities and Not-for-Profits Commission (ACNC) which will have responsibility 
for defining charity tax exemptions.78 It is critical that any attempted fix to a purported hole 
does not cost more than the value of the purported leakage. 
 
Fifth, and building on ideas proposed by Salamon, in a free and democratic society, citizens, 
through their voluntary contributions of time and money, are assumed to be better at assessing 
the demand for public goods and the manner of their provision.79 To remove the exemption and 
replace it with direct grants is to replace citizens’ voluntary choices with those of the state. A 
refinement of this, developed in the manner proposed by Colombo and Hall, might be explored 
if there is a need to limit access.80 
 
In summary, given the probable costs of direct grant supervision, a more efficient way to 
encourage public benefiting purposes and to secure the provision of public and quasi-public 
goods seems to be that adopted by the common law and carried across into Division 50.  It 
centralizes public benefiting purposes as the basis for exemption, but allows citizens – through 
their NFP membership, and through their donations and voluntary labour to finance NFPs, to 
determine the public and quasi-public goods to be delivered.  This is a more efficient way to 
facilitate the supply of public benefit than other options presently under discussion. The case 
                                                 
75 Internal Revenue Service (US), Exempt Organizations FY2010 Anual Report and FY2011 Work Plan (2010) 6, 
http://www.irs.gov/charities/index.html. 
76 Australian National Audit Office, ‘Administration of Deductible Gift Recipients (Non-Profit Sector) 2010–11: 
Australian Taxation Office: Performance Audit’ (Audit Report, No. 52 2010–11, 22 June 2011) 51. 
77 Henry Review, B3. 
78 Treasury, Budget Measures 2011–12 (Budget Paper No. 2, 10 May 2011) 36. 
79 Lester M Salamon, ‘Partners in Public Service: The Scope and Theory of Government–Nonprofit Relations’ in 
WW Powell (ed), The Nonprofit Sector: A Research Handbook (Yale University Press, 1987) 99. 
80 John Colombo and Mark Hall, The Charitable Tax Exemption (Westview Press, 1995) 58. 
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for both the leak and the direct grants fix, have not been made on efficiency grounds.  We turn 
now to equity.  
 
2.4 Equity: not just a bucket but a ‘just’ bucket 
Equity is the Henry Review’s second design principle. There are two important issues for 
consideration under this design principle.  At the threshold level is the simple idea that the tax 
system should ‘treat individuals with similar economic capacity in the same way’, but with an 
eye on complexity and associated costs and risks.81 Beneath this, in relation to NFP entities, is a 
very complex issue of identifying the ‘individual’ to be taxed in a context where the numerous 
beneficiaries are financially disadvantaged, or the beneficiary is the public generally. We take 
the simple idea of equality first and then consider the problem of identifying the individual to 
be taxed.  
 
The equity design principle is that like taxpayers are to be treated alike.  The Henry Review 
recommendation was that not only charitable institutions and funds, but all NFP organisations 
should be permitted to apply their income tax concessions to their commercial activities.82 This 
appears wider than the ATO’s view of the impact of the Word Investments case – that it was 
confined to religious, scientific or public educational institutions.83 Equity also lends weight to 
the argument that membership of a class of organisations with common characteristics should 
be the gateway to exemption, rather than an expanding list of organisations that are ‘largely 
creations of accident and fitful attention’.84  The history and the economic literature support the 
idea that equity might best be served by returning to the original concept that the class is 
‘companies or societies not carrying on business for the purpose of profit or gain’.85 We would 
express this more precisely as a class comprising all voluntary, altruistic organisations with 
                                                 
81 Henry Review, 17. 
82 Ibid 211. 
83 Australian Taxation Office, Decision Impact Statement: Commissioner of Taxation v Word Investments Ltd (26 
May 2009) http://law.ato.gov.au/atolaw/view.htm?DocID=LIT/ICD/M41/3008/00001. 
84 Ann O’Connell, 'Charitable Treatment? – A (Potted) History of the Taxation of Charities in Australia' (Paper 
presented at the Tax History Conference 2010, Cambridge, 5–6 July 2010) 27. 
85 Ibid 2–8, where the author reviews the legislative background and discusses the repetition of this phrase 
throughout colonial legislation.  
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public benefiting purposes.  This would give voice to ideas expressed in the Charities 
Definition Inquiry.86  
 
Access to the class could be limited, but if there is to be a carve out of organisations from the 
class it must be on grounds compatible with the principle of equity.  A way to limit the class is 
through control of the definitions of voluntary, altruistic and public benefit. The economic 
analysis provided frameworks for distinctions that are contested, but arguably equitable. For 
example, trade or professional associations that exist for the advancement of commerce might 
be excluded on the basis that they are indirectly for the advancement of private benefit; or 
quasi-government organisations might be excluded on the basis that they are not voluntary, but 
government.  Access to the exemption might be limited to organisations that manifest altruism 
by reference to particular characteristics.  This approach, we suggest, is more equitable than 
taxing activities or randomly adding or subtracting names to the list of organisations entitled to 
exemption.  If the class is to be limited this brings us to the vexed deeper issue of identifying 
the ‘individual’ to tax.  
 
The Australian income tax laws recognise individuals as the appropriate unit on which to 
impose income taxes as they are the ones who consume or accumulate income.87 Partnerships 
and, to a significant degree, trusts are taxed on a flow-through basis.88 Companies are taxed as 
separate entities from their shareholders, but the imputation system avoids the double taxation 
of corporate profits.89 While there are some deviations, such commercial entities are generally 
viewed as mere conduits.  Tax liabilities are passed on to the individuals who are the ultimate 
recipients. Brennan and Brookes put it neatly as: 
 
                                                 
86 Inquiry into the Definition of Charities and Related Organisations, Report of the Inquiry into the Definition of 
Charities and Related Organisations (2001), 4. 
87 Richard Krever, 'Tax Deductions for Charitable Donations: A Tax Expenditure Analysis' in Richard Krever and 
Gretchen Kewley (eds), Charities and Philanthropic Institutions: Reforming the Tax Subsidy and Regulatory 
Regimes (Comparative Public Policy Research Unit, Monash University, 1991). 
88 Henry Review, 185.  
89 Ibid. 
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Individuals choose, individuals act. Individuals (not families or any other collection of 
them) have utility functions, preferences, moral values. Equity or fairness is, we 
believe, ultimately a matter of relative treatment of individuals.90 
 
Charities in particular, and most other NFP organisations, have no ‘owners’ who benefit, unlike 
companies with shareholders or ordinary trusts with identifiable beneficiaries.91 Some may 
have members, but they do not participate in profits and usually contribute personally whether 
in money, in kind or in personal labour, for which there is no quid pro quo apart from the 
economist’s ‘warm inner glow’ returns.92 Who are the ‘individuals’ who benefit economically 
from pursuit of an NFP enterprise and where do they fall in the progressive taxation spectrum?  
The Henry Review does not address this critical question.  
 
Equity calls for an answer because it is the beneficiaries who should pay the tax. In the context 
of charities the ‘beneficiaries’ can be divided into two broad classes. Atkinson sums it up: 
‘[C]harities provide primary public benefits in two ways: especially good goods to ordinary 
people, and ordinary goods to the especially deserving.’93 The especially good goods are public 
and quasi-public goods such as community radio, art galleries and bridges, which all citizens 
may enjoy.  The ordinary goods are private goods such as food and accommodation provided to 
the needy who especially deserve them because of their social or economic circumstances.  
Taxing the supply to the needy is likely to be futile as they are generally below the income tax 
threshold.  Taxing the enjoyment by the wealthy of voluntarily supplied public and quasi-public 
                                                 
90 Geoffrey Brennan and Michael Brooks, 'Towards a Theory of Family Taxation: The Equity Dimension' in John 
G Head (ed), Taxation Issues of the 1980s (Australian Tax Research Foundation, 1983) 119. 
91 Clearly charities are formed for public purposes rather than for beneficiaries in law, but it may be argued that 
nonprofit mutual and some unincorporated associations have owners, particularly when they benefit on winding up 
of the enterprise. 
92 J Andreoni, 'Giving with Impure Altruism: Applications to Charity and Ricardian Equivalence' (1989) 97 The 
Journal of Political Economy 1447 ; Richard Steinberg, 'Economic Theories of Nonprofit Organizations' in Walter 
W Powell and Richard Steinberg (eds), The Nonprofit Sector: A Research Handbook (Yale University Press, 2nd 
ed, 2006), 130. 
93 Rob Atkinson, 'Nonprofit Symposium: Theories of the Federal Income Tax Exemption for Charities: Thesis, 
Antithesis, and Syntheses' (1997) 27 Stetson Law Review 395, 402; Richard Krever, 'Tax Deductions for Charitable 
Donations: A Tax Expenditure Analysis' in Richard Krever and Gretchen Kewley (eds), Charities and 
Philanthropic Institutions: Reforming the Tax Subsidy and Regulatory Regimes (Comparative Public Policy 
Research Unit, Monash University, 1991). 
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goods may be administratively difficult and expensive, if mixed with supply to the needy. As 
suggested above, a carve out may need to be applied to achieve equity in taxing benefits where 
consumption of public goods is dominated by the wealthy; but this requires attention to linking 
the NFP definition to notions of public benefit.  
 
Equity brings discussion of the exemption back to identifying a privately benefiting individual 
to tax.  The nature of NFP organisations does not allow easy identification: they have no 
owners; produce public not private goods; and their beneficiary attributes confound efficient 
tracing of gains. 
 
2.5 Complexity: the quest for a simple water container 
The third design principle is that the tax provisions should be simple to understand and obey, 
without generating unintended opportunities for tax planning.   
 
In the Henry Review’s assessment of NFP concessions, this design principle took centre stage. 
Utilising the work of the Productivity Commission, the Henry Review found the tax 
concessions were overly complex and should be streamlined, harmonised between 
jurisdictions, modernised and overseen by a specialist regulator.94 We approach this issue of 
complexity in two sections. First, we suggest that it is difficult to tax NFPs effectively where 
they are genuinely pursuing public benefiting purposes, and any attempt to do so will require 
significant complexity of legislation – which would drive up tax administration and compliance 
costs, and would promote tax system gaming.  Second, we examine attempts at taxing unrelated 
business income: what the Henry Review refers to as ‘the conduct of commercial activities’.95  
 
In the transcript of hearing of the Word Investments case, the following exchange took place: 
 
KIRBY J: Could I ask a very naïve question. It must have a very clear answer, but I 
just do not know it. I am sorry if it is too naïve, but I just do not know the answer. 
Would it have been possible for the respondent to organise its affairs so that it had 
Bethel Funerals Limited, but then to give the entirety of its income net of costs to 
                                                 
94 Henry Review, 211–12. 
95 Ibid 212. 
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Australian Translators Limited as a charitable institution and thereby procure for that 
payment a complete deduction for its - - -  
MR MERKEL: Yes.96 
 
In fact there are many ways currently to organise the tax affairs of NFPs to avoid or reduce 
income tax. The following are five quite simple examples of ways in which income intended 
for charitable purposes can be received effectively tax free:97   
 
 As the objects of the organisation are not to make a profit it is often relatively easy 
for an organisation to run at no profit, negligible profit or at a loss by ensuring that 
its expenditure always (almost) exceeds its income (with shortfalls perhaps made up 
by gifts).  
 A NFP business can donate all of its taxable income to a Deductible Gift Recipient 
(DGR) and thus avoid paying tax.  This is made even more attractive when the 
DGR is a Private Ancillary Fund, as the principal philanthropist can effectively 
make the donation, gain the deduction, but delay distribution to DGR organisations 
actually carrying out deductible purposes.   
 The income could be earned by any entity acting as trustee of a discretionary trust, 
the beneficiaries of which include entities that are income tax exempt and receive 
the income distributions.  
 The income could be earned by any form of entity that is an income tax exempt 
charity acting as trustee of a charitable trust. 
 A company in which shares are held by an income tax exempt charity could earn 
the income.  Unfranked dividends could then be paid to a class of shares held by the 
income tax exempt charity or rebate of franked credits could be claimed. 
 
                                                 
96 Transcript of Proceedings, Commissioner of Taxation v Word Investments Limited [2008] HCATrans 314 (27 
August 2008).  
97 Ian Murray, 'Charity Means Business – Commissioner of Taxation v Word Investments Ltd' (2009) 31 Sydney 
Law Review 309. 
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In the 2011 budget, the government announced that from 1 July 2011 it would tax profits from 
unrelated commercial activities of NFPs that commence after 10 May 2011, where the profits 
are not directed to an NFP’s purposes.98 This would be extended to all NFP activities after 
consultation. It appears to apply income tax only to earnings retained in their unrelated 
commercial undertaking with exemptions for small scale, low risk unrelated commercial 
activities and some government service delivery contracts. The aim is to increase competitive 
neutrality and protect community assets from unnecessary commercial risks.99 Whether the 
arrangement will in fact achieve this, without bringing undue complexity and administration 
costs, is yet to be determined. The experiences with such arrangements in other jurisdictions 
have not been encouraging.  
 
An unrelated business income tax is a complex way of taxing income of otherwise exempt 
organisations. We will consider its implementation in the US and the UK as they use quite 
different approaches; then comment briefly on the situation in Canada and New Zealand.  
 
2.6 Unrelated Business Income Tax 
The US introduced an unrelated business income tax (UBIT) in 1950100 in response to unfair 
competition claims, with income tax exempt NFP organisations regularly generating income by 
carrying on business activities unrelated to their core purposes.101 Under UBIT, tax exempt 
NFP organisations are taxed at the corporate tax rate on income not related to their core 
purposes. 
 
A large number of exemptions and exclusions provided that income was exempt when 
produced from: 
                                                 
98 The Treasury, Budget Measures 2011–12 (Budget Paper No. 2, 10 May 2011) 36. 
99 Ibid. 
100 John G Simon, Harvey Dale and Laura Chisolm, 'The Federal Tax Treatment of Charitable Organizations' in 
Walter W Powell and Richard Steinberg (eds), The Nonprofit Sector: A Research Handbook (Yale University 
Press, 2nd ed, 2006) 267. 
101 These included, notoriously, the operation of a business called Mueller Macaroni, by New York University Law 
School. The IRS has brought litigation against exempt organisations on the basis that the ‘tail wags the dog’ – 
unrelated business having become so large quantitatively that the organisation can no longer be said to operate for 
exempt purposes; see Better Business Bureau v United States 326 US 279 (1945); and Evelyn Brody, 'Business 
Activities of Nonprofit Organizations: Legal Boundary Problems' in Joseph J Cordes and C Eugene Steuerle (eds), 
Nonprofits and Business (Urban Institute Press, 2009) 83, 93–4.  
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 infrequent transactions, rather than regular business; 
 substantially the labour of volunteers; 
 the sale of donated items; 
 the conduct of certain NFP gaming (e.g. bingo); 
 passive investments such as dividends, interest, annuities, payments with respect to 
securities, loans, royalties, and property rentals; or 
 research.102 
In the 1980s, a House Committee embarked on a hearing of complaints by small business that 
the width of exceptions and lax IRS enforcement effectively allowed unfair competition by 
exempt organisations. After a marathon hearing, an extensive set of recommendations was 
published, but never implemented as ‘Congress faced a difficult choice between two important 
constituencies, each wearing a white hat’.103 
 
Unlike Australia, there are some measures in the US to inform the tax expenditures debate. An 
IRS special statistical report on UBIT in 2007 established that, in fact, little unrelated income of 
NFPs was taxed.104 About 4 per cent of NFP charitable organisations reported unrelated 
business income — less than half of 1 per cent of their aggregate revenue of 
$US1,072.2 billion, resulting in an extra $US63.3 million in tax collected. This small amount is 
attributed to a number of factors such as the width of exemptions, sophisticated tax planning, 
errors and ignorance of the specific provisions.105 
 
                                                 
102 Internal Revenue Service, 'Tax on Unrelated Business Income of Exempt Organizations' (Publication 598 
(03/2010), United States Department of the Treasury, March 2010) 
http://www.irs.gov/publications/p598/index.html. 
103 Evelyn Brody, 'Business Activities of Nonprofit Organizations: Legal Boundary Problems' in Joseph J Cordes 
and C Eugene Steuerle (eds), Nonprofits and Business (Urban Institute Press, 2009), 99. 
104 Margaret Riley, 'Unrelated Business Income Tax Returns, 2003: Financial Highlights and A Special Analysis of 
Nonprofit Charitable Organizations' Revenue and Taxable Income' (2003) 26 Statistics of Income Bulletin 88. 
105 Evelyn Brody, 'Business Activities of Nonprofit Organizations: Legal Boundary Problems' in Joseph J Cordes 
and C Eugene Steuerle (eds), Nonprofits and Business (Urban Institute Press, 2009), 97; Richard Sansing, 'The 
Unrelated Business Income Tax, Cost Allocation and Productive Efficiency' (1998) 51 National Tax Journal 83. 
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While an Australian version of such a tax might be designed to overcome the issues of wide 
exemptions and lax enforcement, the US experience shows that the tax has some basic 
definitional issues which impact on tax administration and compliance costs. Two examples 
from the IRS Guidance make the point. A NFP art museum with a shop would have to ensure 
‘[e]ach line of merchandise must be considered separately to determine if sales are related to 
the exempt purpose’,106 so a shirt with a print of an art work held by the museum (related) 
would be taxed differently from a shirt with a print of an art work held outside the museum 
(unrelated). Where facilities and staff are used for both related and unrelated purposes, both 
income and expenses must be allocated, which can be difficult to determine, verify and 
regulate.107 One US commentator, Thomas Kelley, believes that this confusion is because what 
‘appears simple in the regulation has become muddled in the execution’ by the IRS.108 The 
implication of his argument, is that if the IRS had followed simple processes, similar to that 
adopted by the High Court of Australia, the law would not have deteriorated to ‘an 
unprincipled, unpredictable test that amounts to an examination of whether the organization 
“smell[s] like” a charity to whomever is inquiring’.109 
In the UK, a different structural approach has been taken with unrelated business income, but it 
also results in little revenue being collected, and significant administration and compliance 
costs. At common law, NFP organisations wishing to benefit from charitable status must be 
established with exclusively charitable objects. The Charity Commission for England and 
Wales will refuse to register charities with objects for trading, because trading is not a 
charitable object.110 Charities are able to trade to achieve their primary purposes such as fees 
for the use of services from schools, hospitals and museums. While small businesses in the UK 
                                                 
106 Internal Revenue Service, 'Tax on Unrelated Business Income of Exempt Organizations' (Publication 598 
(03/2010), United States Department of the Treasury, March 2010) 
http://www.irs.gov/publications/p598/index.html. 
107 Ibid.  
108 Thomas Kelley, 'Rediscovering Vulgar Charity: A Historical Analysis of America's Tangled Nonprofit Law' 
(2005) 73 Fordham Law Review 2437, 2475. 
109 Ibid, 2463, citing Jessica Pena and Alexander LT Reid, 'A Call for Reform of the Operational Test for Unrelated 
Commerical Activity in Charities' (2001) 76 New York University Law Review 1855, 1856–8. 
110 See Peter Luxton, The Law of Charities (Oxford University Press, 2001) 20.2 (citing refusal of Charity 
Commission of England and Wales to register entities with such objects as charities); Jean Warburton, Debra 
Morris and NF Riddle, Tudor on Charities (Sweet & Maxwell, 2003), 7.039. 
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voiced similar concerns about unfair competition, the basis for restricting unrelated business 
activities is that trading would involve significant risk to the assets of the charity.111   
This stance has promoted the use of charity trading subsidiaries which are controlled by the 
charity, but which separate risk from the charity’s assets.  The profits from a trading subsidiary 
do not qualify for charity tax exemption and are liable to corporation tax. However, payments 
(Gift Aid contributions) made by the trading subsidiary to the controlling charity reduce the 
level of profits which are taxable in the trading subsidiary. Tax exemption is available to the 
recipient charity in respect of the income which it receives from the trading subsidiary. Any 
dual use of assets or staff must be apportioned. The net result is that there are additional costs 
of establishment and maintenance of the separate legal structures, tax administration and 
compliance costs, but little added income tax revenue.112  
Where unrelated business trading does occur in charities, it will be taxed at the corporation rate. 
The UK Finance Act 2006 amended the Income and Corporations Taxes Act 1988 so that for 
chargeable periods on or after 21 March 2006, UK law deems the primary purpose and the non-
primary purpose parts of the trade to be separate trades.113  The trade deemed primary purpose 
will be exempt from tax as long as its profits are used for charitable purposes.  The trade 
deemed non-primary purpose is taxable, although there is an exemption for small trading.114 
Deductible expenses are apportioned with all the consequent issues faced in the US under 
UBIT. There are also exclusions for irregular fundraising events where all proceeds flow to the 
charity.115 
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In 2002 the UK Cabinet Office Strategy Unit reviewed charitable sector regulation and 
recommended abolishing the requirement to separate unrelated commercial activities as it was 
‘administratively complex, expensive for individual charities, and can inhibit them from 
diversifying their income streams’.116 The recommendation was not adopted by the government 
because of concerns over competitive neutrality issues.117 
 
In Canada, an organisation can lose its registration as charitable and the taxation benefits that 
attach, if it carries on an unrelated business.118 That approach seems unnecessarily severe. In 
New Zealand there is no unrelated business income tax, but the boundary of benefits passing to 
related parties is clearly marked and breach leads to taxation of that income.119 
 
The proposed Australian reform to the use of tax concessions by businesses operated by NFPs 
appears to contain elements of the UK provisions, with notions of taxing only retained profits 
from unrelated business, with a suggested separation of activities in a taxable trading entity.120 
The emphasis on protection of charity assets from unnecessary risks is also a theme shared with 
the UK regime. 
 
The Industry Commission came to the conclusion that ‘unrelated business income is a concept 
that is too difficult to define and too costly to enforce, and consequently the costs are likely to 
outweigh the benefits’.121  This was also the opinion of the Productivity Commission.  The US 
and UK experience with UBIT is a salutary warning.  The need to avoid complexity obliges 
Australia to remain focused on taxing individuals where private benefit is discernible.  It is a 
simple concept.   
                                                 
116 HM Cabinet Office, Strategy Unit, Private Action, Public Benefit: A Review of Charities and the Wider Not for 
Profit Sector (2002) 44. 
117 Belinda Pratten, ‘Charity Law Reform: Implementing the Strategy Unit Proposals’ (2004) 9 International 
Journal of Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Marketing 191, 197. 
118 Income Tax Act RSC 1985, c 1 (5th Supp), s 149.1(2)(a) for charities designated as charitable organisations, and 
s 149.1(3)(a) for charities designated as public foundations. See also Canada Revenue Agency, Policy Statement: 
What is a Related Business? (CPS–019, 31 March 2003) http://www.cra-arc.gc.ca/chrts-gvng/chrts/plcy/cps/cps-
019-eng.html. 
119 Income Tax Act 2007 sub-ss CW42(1) and (9).  
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2.7 Sustainability: a bucket that will last  
Sustainability is the fourth design principle.122 Sadiq and Richardson argue in a recent article 
that the sustainability of the tax base is a critical issue that must be addressed and that ‘erosion 
of the integrity of the tax base without an overarching public benefit’ is a mischief that must be 
rectified.123 For the Henry Review, this is about ensuring that the tax expenditure is ‘affordable 
over the longer term, particularly in the light of the demographic challenges facing 
Australia’.124  Sustainability is linked to the levels of service to be provided; the quantum of 
revenue available for collection to supply those services; and the level of compliance.  These 
issues are all live in the context of the exemptions extended to NFPs.  The first because NFPs 
share with government in the supply of services. The second because the number of 
organisations that are exempt and the extent of their trading activity are both increasing. Third 
because the mantra of unfair competition recited by small business and the popular media is 
showing no signs of abatement and is eroding confidence in the legitimacy of the exemption.  
With the exception of competitive neutrality the Henry Review’s examination of NFP tax 
concessions did not address these issues directly. They are now explored.  
 
The role of NFPs and the NFP income tax expenditures are both set to grow. The Productivity 
Commission has provided some evidence that the NFP sector had an average annual growth 
rate (excluding volunteers) of 7.7 per cent in the period from 1999–2000 to 2006–07, equating 
to a growth from 3.3 per cent of GDP to 4.1 per cent of GDP.125 This is double the growth in 
the Australian economy. Collaterally, gifts (up 11 per cent) and volunteering nominal value (up 
4.3 per cent) are also growing.126 Australia is not alone in this trend. The USA, the UK, New 
Zealand and Canada have all been experiencing consistent overall sector growth.127 There are 
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Study of the Nonprofit Enterprise – Theories and Approaches (Kluwer Academic, 2003) 183; Lester Salamon, 'Of 
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Relations in the Modern Welfare State' (1987) 16 Journal of Voluntary Action Research 35; Robert D Putnam, 
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many drivers of this growth. They include the contraction of the welfare state with 
governments contracting out functions mostly to the NFP sector in health, education, housing, 
welfare and human services. The contracting out of human services by government is likely to 
continue, given the continuing propensity for New Public Management (NPM)128 strategies 
involving outsourcing in the belief that it is a better option than direct government provision of 
services.  
 
Less widely known is the contribution to sustainability that NFPs make by reducing the amount 
of tax that must be collected for services to be delivered. NFPs are able to achieve cross-
subsidisation through fundraising, philanthropy and volunteer labour and provide services more 
efficiently and effectively than governments. The Productivity Commission estimates the 
subsidisation of government service contracts is roughly 30 per cent across all government 
departments.129  Unless government decides to pay the full cost of delivering such services, 
there will be pressure on NFP organisations to keep developing alternative sources of revenue 
if they wish to keep contracting with government. In the UK, there has been some 
quantification of the effect of NPM, with the National Council for Voluntary Organisations 
(NCVO) reporting that earned income from contracts and sales of goods and services rose from 
39 per cent of NFPs’ total revenue in 2001 to 51 per cent in 2006.130 The 30 per cent subsidy 
estimated by the Productivity Commission is a direct reduction in the funds needed through 
taxation to deliver comparable services, but does not include the additional cost of collecting 
the taxes and redistributing the funds.    
 
The for-profit sector’s difficulty in competing with NFPs in human service delivery is due, in 
part at least, to the NFPs’ capacity to cross-subsidise through fundraising and volunteers and 
the absence of functioning markets. It is not solely because of the income tax exemption.  The 
concern about unfair competition, however, remains. In the Word Investments hearing, Justice 
Kirby expressed the sentiment: 
 
                                                 
128 NPM emphasises hands-on, private sector-styled management, greater levels of performance measurement and 
output control, parsimonious use of resources, disaggregation of public sector units, and greater competition in the 
public sector: C Hood, ‘A public management for all seasons?’ (1991) 69(1) Public Administration 3, 5. 
129 Productivity Commission Research Report, 281. 
130 National Council for Voluntary Organisations, The UK Civil Society Almanac 2009 (2009).  
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I just cannot get out of my mind that if I had the Michael Kirby Funeral Home I would 
really be very cheesed off that there was this Bethel Funeral Home that was getting a 
tax advantage of being a charitable institution.131 
 
Counsel for Word answered the point by referring to the considered economic analysis of the 
Industry Commission in 1995: 
 
Income tax exemption does not compromise competitive neutrality between 
organisations. All organisations which, regardless of their taxation status, aim to 
maximise their surplus (profit), are unaffected in their business decisions by their tax or 
tax-exempt status.132 
 
This reply has been in the public domain in Australia for over fifteen years, yet the mantra of 
unfair competition remains. A serious distortion might arise only if exempt organisations used 
the concession to drive competitors from the market through discounting. There was no 
evidence of this. If distortions did occur, they could perhaps be economically tolerated where 
they deliver commensurate benefits not included in the transaction price (spillovers)133 or 
compensate for disadvantages faced by NFP organisations such as problems accessing 
capital.134 In his dissenting judgment in Word Investments Justice Kirby appeared now to 
accept the economic view, but with the proviso that: 
 
[T]o the extent that such institutions engage in investment and commercial business 
undertakings with a view to profit, they invite upon themselves a strict scrutiny. In such 
a case, they are in competition with others in the marketplace who do not enjoy any of 
the economic advantages that the exemption affords.135 
 
                                                 
131 Transcript of Proceedings, Commissioner of Taxation v Word Investments Limited [2008] HCA Trans 314 (27 
August 2008) (Kirby J). 
132 Ibid. 
133 Odours from a sewerage plant are negative spillover effects upon its neighbours; the beauty of a resident's 
flower garden is a positive spillover effect upon neighbours. 
134 Henry Hansmann, 'The Rationale for Exempting Nonprofit Organizations from the Corporate Income Tax' 
(1981) 91 Yale Law Journal 54, 92. 
135 C of T v Word Investments Limited (2008) 236 CLR 204, [117]–[120] (Kirby J). 
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Confidence is undermined if in fact NFPs are run for private benefit. The Henry Review’s 
stated principle, consistent with the central concept of charity law, is that NFP organisations 
should receive tax concessions for their activities that ‘provide broad public benefits’.136 
Careful scrutiny for private benefiting purposes, and denial of the exemption where they are 
found, are likely to be important in sustaining both the system and its exemptions.  There is a 
second area for scrutiny also flagged by the Henry Review and that is that tax exemption 
‘should not undermine competitive neutrality where NFP organisations operate in commercial 
markets’.137 As Hansmann noted this is most likely to arise in the supply of services such as 
health where the services supplied border on private as distinct from public goods. This inquiry 
may dissolve over time into a boundary contest between public and private benefit.  Suffice it 
to say for present purposes that the Henry Review found the current income tax concessions do 
not generally violate the principle of competitive neutrality138 and recommended that such 
organisations should be permitted to continue to apply their income tax concessions to their 
commercial activities.139 It is not clear what new information motivated the government in 
2011 to depart from this finding and recommendation and determine that a curb on unrelated 
commercial income was needed. 
 
Given that, on the one hand, NFPs in Australia might be contributing as much as 30 per cent to 
government savings, and are likely to continue growing in number and economic significance, 
and on the other hand that the criticisms of unfair competition have ancient roots and are not 
likely to abate, a two pronged approach to sustainability might be appropriate.  First, the 
contribution of NFPs needs to be voiced by the sector, its supporters and government, with a 
view to this contribution also finding a place in popular discourse. Second, the calls for 
increased transparency and accountability should be focused on eradicating private benefiting 
purposes, so that the public benefiting foundation of the exemptions is preserved.  Having said 
that, in the US, where the UBIT applies to NFP organisations and there is robust tax 
expenditure data, Professor Brody reports that ‘it [still] appears that to small business, any 
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competition is by definition unfair’.140 This is despite an aggressively defensive voice from the 
NFP sector.  
 
2.8 Policy consistency of tax expenditures: not just any bucket but the right bucket for our well 
The fifth and last design principle proposed by the Henry Review is consistency with broader 
government policy objectives. There are three relevant issues for policy consistency: first, the 
policy reasons for the existing state of affairs; second, the emerging external policy dimension 
of contracting the NFP sector to deliver community services; and third, bringing policy 
consistency to the more than 30 NFP tax expenditures listed in Division 50.  
 
The policy reasons behind the existing income tax exemptions in Division 50 is wrapped in a 
tale that starts with earliest civilisations – recounting it in full is beyond the length of this 
article. The central theme of that tale was pithily summarised by Paul Keating and cited in the 
recent Federal Court decision in Wentworth District Capital Ltd v Commissioner of 
Taxation.141 That case concerned the interpretation of one of the more expansive, later 
additions to Division 50, ‘community service purposes’, which now finds expression as section 
50–10.  Commenting on the scope of the section, Perram J considered the legislative history, 
noting: 
 
On its introduction the then Treasurer, Mr Keating, also circulated to the members of 
the House of Representatives an explanatory memorandum. There are two passages in 
that memorandum which are pertinent for present purposes. The first, which in clause 
six appeared under the heading ‘Introductory Note: sporting bodies and the community 
services organisations’, was in the following terms: 
Among the institutions exempted from income tax under paragraph 23(e) are 
charitable institutions. However, many organisations that undertake a range of 
activities for the benefit or welfare of the community are not charitable, and so 
such bodies as the traditional community service clubs — Apex, Rotary, Lions, 
Zonta, Quota and the like — have not qualified for exemption. 
                                                 
140 Evelyn Brody, 'Business Activities of Nonprofit Organizations: Legal Boundary Problems' in Joseph J Cordes 
and C Eugene Steuerle (eds), Nonprofits and Business (Urban Institute Press, 2009), 99. 
141 [2010] FCA 862. 
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There then followed a section detailing the exemptions. Relevantly that memorandum 
went on to say: 
Paragraph (b) of this clause will introduce subparagraph 23(g)(v) which will 
exempt from income tax the income of not-for-profit bodies established for 
community service purposes. The words ‘for community service purposes’ are 
not defined but are to be given a wide interpretation. The words are not limited 
to those purposes beneficial to the community which are also charitable. They 
extend to a range of altruistic purposes. The words would extend to promoting, 
providing or carrying on activities, facilities or projects for the benefit or 
welfare of the community, or of any members of the community who have 
particular need of those activities, facilities or projects by reason of their youth, 
age, infirmity or disablement, poverty or social or economic circumstances. An 
exclusion from the exemption will apply to bodies established for political or 
lobbying purposes.142  
 
The listing of organisations known for their voluntary contributions as examples, the stated 
importance of altruism and the centrality of public benefit are significant. What is now section 
50–10 was intended to extend the favour of exemption to these voluntary, altruistic, public 
benefiting organisations (that were not charities) and thereby fill a gap. We suggest that the 
government at the time was fulfilling an underlying policy that all organisations that are 1) 
voluntary, 2) altruistic, and 3) public benefiting, should be exempt from income tax. Therefore 
we contend that the time has come to revisit the list of exempt organisations and look again for 
a broader, simpler statement of the relevant class. We will return to this issue, but first there is a 
policy consistency issue with government outsourcing and reliance on NFPs for the creation of 
public goods. 
 
In the last section we pointed out that greater reliance is being placed on NFP bodies to produce 
public goods and perform essential public services which were once the province and 
responsibility of the state.143 This is a trend across the western world.144 Charites are being 
                                                 
142 [2010] FCA 862, [38]–[39], quoting from Explanatory Memorandum, Taxation Laws Amendment Bill (No 2) 
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partly funded to deliver a rapidly increasing range of human services, a trend which will 
accelerate with an ageing population driving the need for services. Increasingly, government is 
chanelling overseas development aid through NFP agencies. NFP industry bodies are now 
responsible for significant self-regulation of major industries and professional services. Cultural 
and sports infrastructure involves quasi-government NFPs which raise funds to build, develop 
and operate museums, galleries, arenas and community performance venues. Environment 
groups are set to play an important role in climate change and other environmental issues. 
There are wider policy objectives in government’s relationship with the NFP sector (not just 
charities) which are important and will become more important. The Productivity Commission 
Report outlines a significant policy agenda for the challenges that this sectoral shift and rapid 
future growth will inevitably bring.145 Tax expenditures play a part in financing the sector and 
any decision to alter this needs to be taken with cognisance of this broader policy environment.  
The area of overlap between government on the one hand and charities and other exempt 
entities on the other is that both exist for public benefit. As Matthew Harding pointedly 
observed: 
 
Philosophers will tell you that the business of government is — or at least ought to be 
— to enable the pursuit of, or even directly to pursue, the common good. Any lawyer 
will tell you that ‘the pursuit of the common good’ sounds like a description of the 
business of charity according to modern Australian law, ‘charity’ in our law consisting 
of an oddly circumscribed group of purposes that, if carried out, will benefit the public. 
Put broadly, then, government and charity — at least charity in the legal sense — are in 
the same business.146 
 
We suggest that by focusing on the overlapping function of government and charities, policy 
consistency is maintained, justifying the exemption. On the government side of the equation 
public benefit is supplied through the coercive powers of the state to satisfy the demands of the 
                                                                                                                                                        
Market Failure, Voluntary Failure, and Third Party Government: Toward a Theory of Government–Nonprofit 
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median voter (to use Weisbrod’s analysis).147 On the NFP side, public benefit is supplied 
voluntarily to satisfy the needs of minorities. The policy purpose of both the taxation and 
exemption is the supply of public benefit. There is, then, consistent implementation of a policy 
of supplying public benefit by two different streams. We come now to the third issue, an 
internal policy dimension.  
 
Both the Productivity Commission and Henry Review found NFP taxation to be complex, 
confusing and in need of simplification.148 Arguably the rationale behind all of the exemptions 
set out in Division 50 were articulated in the Explanatory Memorandum introducing the 
community service exemption that is now section 50–10. Developing the wording of the 
Memorandum into a definition suitable for legal application the following simplification 
emerges:   
 
Voluntary organisations that exist for the pursuit of altruistic purposes that benefit the 
community are entitled to exemption from income tax unless they are excluded. Without 
limiting the generality of this provision all charities and other organisations that serve 
persons who by reason of their youth, age, infirmity or disablement, poverty or social 
or economic circumstances require support are exempt. [The provision could then be 
extended to list all of the other purposes presently in Division 50, such as 
encouragement of sport, culture and resource development].  
 
Organisations established for the following purposes are not exempt: political or 
lobbying…149 [The provision could then be extended to list all of the purposes expressly 
to be excluded such as organisations for the pursuit of business purposes, government 
purposes or private purposes.] 
 
This is a return to first principles and policy, consistent with the original framing of the 
exemption in Australia. It is a return to exemption of all ‘companies or societies not carrying on 
                                                 
147 B Weisbrod (ed) To Profit or Not to Profit: The Commercial Transformation of the Nonprofit Sector 
(Cambridge University Press, 1998). 
148 Productivity Commission Research Report, 155–68, Appendix E. 
149 Following the High Court case of Aid/Watch Inc v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (2010) 241 CLR 539 
political and lobbying purposes are no longer excluded at common law.  
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business for the purpose of profit or gain’,150 albeit framed differently in an endeavour to be 
more precise.151 
 
3. CONCLUSION — THERE IS NO HOLE IN THE BUCKET BUT WE MUST DECIDE ITS SHAPE AND SIZE  
The populist discourse is problematic.  It rests on the assumption that Australians are worse off 
because there is lost taxation revenue as a result of the exemption of some organisations from 
income tax.  This assumption rests on theoretical and practical assumptions that are at best 
contested. The popular discourse assumes that the revenue of income tax exempt organisations 
can come within the definition of income tax expenditures, and if they can, that this ‘lost’ 
revenue can be measured. There is a legitimate debate to be had over what is taxable income in 
the context of public benefiting purpose organisations so it cannot be assumed that such income 
is ‘lost’ taxable revenue. Further, all the evidence before the inquiries to date shows that this 
‘lost’ revenue cannot be measured fully and thus cannot be verified; nor can alternatives be 
properly assessed.   
 
At a practical level the popular debate assumes that policy changes such as the introduction of 
an unrelated business income tax will be both effective in recovering the ‘lost’ tax revenue and 
worth the effort it takes to recover that tax. The international and Australian evidence does not 
support this contention.  The history of the exemption is one of continual expansion. That 
expansion has been in the teeth of objections. Insofar as the objections suggest that the 
expansion has been ad hoc and not grounded in principle they are arguably correct. Insofar as 
the criticisms suggest that the definition of NFPs and the reasons given by the Henry Review 
are inadequate to justify the recommendations they are also arguably right.  The principles have 
existed, though, and been applied in the common law doctine of charitable purpose. The 
reasons were set out by the then Treasurer, Paul Keating when introducing further expansion to 
the class. The seeds are evident in the earliest Australian exemption legislation. However, the 
principles have not been expanded into an exemption jurisprudence suitable for application in 
Australia in the twenty-first century.  
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The Henry Review stated that it ‘aimed to set the strategic directions for the future architecture 
of the Australian tax and transfer system’.152 This paper has sought to contribute to that 
architectural development in two ways. First, by highlighting weaknesses in the Henry 
Review’s definition of NFP organisations and offering an alternative approach. We have 
argued that there is an identifiable class of organisations entitled to exemption. These are 
organisations which are essentially: 
 
1. voluntary (that is, non-government); 
2. altruistic (that is, non-business; not supplied from profit motive); and  
3. public benefiting (that is, not private). 
 
These essential characteristics distinguish exempt organisations such as charities from other 
organisations and could provide a basis for a simplification of Division 50.  
 
Second, this paper has sought to justify and defend the Henry Review’s Recommendation 42, 
that ‘organisations that currently receive income tax or GST concessions should retain these 
concessions’ and ‘should be permitted to apply their income concessions to their commercial 
activities’.153 It has been argued that these organisations are entitled to exemption because they 
have the particular characteristics just mentioned — most notably they exist for the purpose of 
contributing public benefit. Arguing from first principles, we suggest that all organisations 
falling within this class are entitled to exemption. If the class is to be limited, economic theory 
provides tools for limiting it in a principled way. We have not explored limitation. We further 
suggest that the scope of the exemption is most easily limited by confining the definition of 
voluntary, altruistic or public benefit. We suggest that it is the public benefit–private benefit 
boundary that is most in need of policing.  The reasoning in Word Investments was sound. The 
historical development of the exemption may have been haphazard, but underlying principles 
are evident and traceable to the origin of NFPs’ exemption from income tax. Looking for leaks 
in the bucket from NFP commercial activities is a fruitless exercise. 
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